A critical analysis of abuse of dominance in credit card markets

Introduction

The story of anti-competitiveness in the UPI Market is on trend. However, people are neglecting the new emerging problem which is arising in the market of Credit Cards and Debit Cards Apart from UPI Payment Method, Debit and Credit Cards, has been issued as the preferable method of payment in many of the countries which are industrial in nature.

In the recent picture, major Card network holders of US and other countries are opposing the supremacy of Rupay and the policies framed in its regard. Since, once upon a time, Cards like VISA and Mastercard were enjoying supremacy but with the emergence of Ru-Pay cards, the autonomy and monopolisations of these companies has come to an end. With this the present article in its first part has tried to phrase the major arguments of these major companies against Rupay, and subsequently has also framed arguments in favour of Rupay also. Subsequently in the second part the article has presented a critical analysis applying the basic provisions of the Competition Act of 2002 to justify the position of Rupay in India.

Vertical Agreements under the Indian Competition Law Scheme

The Competition Act, 2002, was put into effect with the goal of promoting a free market economy without the interference of anti-competitive elements or arrangements. The Act regulates any type of anti-competitive behaviour by market players to ensure a competitive environment and consumer welfare, and Section 3 of the said act deals specifically with anti- competitive agreements in furtherance of this goal (the present paper shall only deal with the concepts of Vertical agreements as it is pertinent to the issue in hand).

The Competition Act of 2002’s Section 3(1) interprets an anti-competitive agreement as one that has or is likely to have an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) in India.[1]An effects-based approach is used to evaluate how these agreements will affect competition because they are not inherently anti-competitive.

Section 3(4) of the Competition Act provides a list of vertical agreements that could lead to an AAEC.[2]These are:

• Tie-in arrangements,[3] if tying or bundling arrangements are prohibited by the Act. Tying is the practice of making the sale of one product (the tying product) contingent upon the acquisition of another one (the tied product). Selling two unrelated things together is referred to as bundling.
• Exclusive supply agreements, includes any arrangement preventing the buyer from purchasing or otherwise transacting in any items other than those provided by the seller or another person throughout the course of its trade.
• Exclusive distribution agreements, entails any agreement to limit, restrict, or withhold the production or distribution of any goods, or to set aside a specific territory or market for the sale or disposal of the commodities.

• Refusals to deal, an agreement that limits or is likely to limit the person who purchases or sells goods.
• Resale price maintenance, refers to “any agreement to sell products subject to the requirement that the prices to be charged on the purchaser’s resale by the seller shall be the prices established by the seller unless it is expressly indicated that rates cheaper than any of these prices may be charged.”

It is not assumed that the all vertical agreements have anticompetitive effects; rather, after the existence of an agreement has been established, the question of whether it causes or is likely to produce an AAEC is decided based on an analysis of the rule of reason.[4]The CCI has primarily focused on market power, which is the ability to hold prices above levels of competition or to halt output, product quality and variety, and innovation below levels of competition, for a not insignificant amount of time, furthermore the statutory factors listed in Section 19(3) of the Competition Act. Entails any agreement to limit, restrict, or withhold the production or supply of any goods, or to set aside a specific territory or market for the sale or disposal of the commodities.

Exclusive agreements naturally restrict the number of manufacturers and/or dealers for a specific good or service in the relevant market. As a result, worries about the market being foreclosed, entrance hurdles, and driving out current competitors, all of which have an influence on consumer choice and welfare.

Abuse of Dominance

Abuse of dominance power occurs when a prevailing company or a dominating company takes action that significantly decreases or eliminates competition in a market and eliminates others who are already in the market and also restricts new entities to enter into the market. These activities are anti-competitive in nature as abuse of dominance decreases competition in the market.

Essential for the abuse of dominance power that needs to be proved before the competition tribunal for such cases are:

• The ability to set prices above competitive levels.

• The overall degree of competition in the market has been significantly diminished or is expected to be further reduced by the anticompetitive actions of dominant firms.
  • The dominating firms that are involved in the anti-competitive tactics are meant to harm the competition in the market using predatory pricing as a tool. Section 4 (1) and section 19 of the competition act talks about this.

Procedure followed by the commission while looking at such abuse of dominant cases.

• Inquiry into the abuse of dominance: – section 19(4) provides a list of the factors the Commission will take into account when looking into any claim of abuse of dominance. Complete the examination and inquiry and create a report.
• Powers of the commission: – section 27 and 28 of the competition Act states the power of the commission.
• Interim order: – section 33 of the act the commission may control and pass an interim order as it deem fit till the case is pending before the tribunal.
• Appeals: – Under Section 53A of the Act, the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) was established to consider and reject complaints. Also, the appeal should be filed within 60 days of the order passed.
• Penalties and sanctions: – section 4 provides for penalties and sanctions. Also, commission “Direct the undertaking to suspend such acts that add up to misuse where the overarching parties were mentioned to stop it from getting a charge out of activities that had been viewed as in invalidation of Section 4”.[1] It is also mentioned that the penalty should amounts to 10 percent of the turnover for the last three preceding year. “COMPAT held that punishments are to be determined based on the significant turnover so the punishment will be decided on the basis of the turnover of the particular firm”.[2]

The company performing such functions and creating an anti-competitive environment should be punished for the betterment of the consumer welfare. Also, the market is a place which should provide equal opportunity and fair chances to everyone who is willing to enter into the market and who wants to do a business without any biasness. New entrants should not get affected by the already existing dominant powers in the market. The COMPAT is trying to diminish all such activities related to abuse of dominant power.

The Market Structure of Credit Card Holders in India

At this juncture it is crucial for us to understand the structure of the credit card markets. The companies/banks associated herein with the credit card market operate in the following two manners to earn the profits:

1. Either the company/bank charges annually for their services, or
2. They charge a certain amount from the merchants for each of their transactions, whether small or huge.

In the present scenario Visa and Mastercard adopts either of the following business models. However, Rupay’s business model is altogether a different model wherein they don’t charge any annual sum or transaction fee form the merchants as per the norms of the NPCI (National Payments Corporation of India) and RBI (Reserve Bank of India), making it feasible and more economical even for the small merchants, keeping aside the value of transactions.

Further, as per the present market share, Rupay holds 60% market share in the market of Debit Cards, whereas 1/5th (approximately 20%) in the market of Credit Cards, leaded by Visa and followed by Mastercard.[7] Let’s understand the possible arguments from the side of Mastercard and Visa against Rupay and Rupay’s counter to that. Reasoning of some arguments have been retracted from the famous judgment of Ohio v. American Express Company.[8]

Arguments of Mastercard and Visa against Rupay

• HIGHER MERCHANT FEE IN FUTURE: Having a market share of almost 60%, undoubtedly Rupay is dominant in the market of debit cards. Presently, it is acceptable that Rupay is not charging any sought of transaction fee from the merchants for using its card services, but once the total dominance of Rupay would be established then to gain popularity amongst the consumers, who are very price sensitive, Rupay will for sure charge more from merchants for using its services, thereby will end up abusing its dominance in the market. As S. 3(1) of the Competition Act includes ‘likely to cause’ any appreciable adverse effect on the competition in the market, which allows us to presume this possible threat of anti-competitive behaviour of Rupay in near future.

• HIGHER INCENTIVES IN THE FORM OF REWARDS IN VERTICAL INTEGRATION WOULD LEAD TO FORECLOSURE: Rupay would use its dominance in the market of debit cards to enter into the market of credit cards which would lead to foreclosure of rivals due to rising of rival cost. As again to gain the customers in the form of credit card users, Rupay will give lucrative rewards to customers who have higher spending capacity by charging high from merchants, concentrating on loyalty more than scope thereby ending abusing its dominance in debit card market to enter into another market of credit cards by barring rivals. Moreover, recoupment of short-term losses incurred credit card market would be easier from profits of Rupay in debit card market.
• ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS ARE PER SE ANTI-COMPETITIVE: There is a high possibility that Rupay would use anti-steering contractual provisions to cause disadvantage to the rivals by vertically integrating with merchants and abusing its dominance as held in Ohio v. American Express Company.[9] Let’s understand how this works.

When a cardholder buys something from a merchant who accepts Rupay’s card, Rupay through its network services processes the transaction, and pay the amount to merchants after deducting its transaction fee. Now, if a merchant wants to accept Rupay’s credit cards and attracts Rupay’s cardholders to its business, it is mandatory for the merchants to enter into the anti-steering contractual provisions. The anti-steering clause forbids retailers from barring consumers from using their Rupay cards after they have entered the store and are about to make a purchase in order to avoid paying Rupay’s charge.

As held in the instance of Am-Ex cards, where Am-Ex used anti-steering provisions to cause disadvantage to Visa and Mastercard, at that time Discover tried to increase its transaction fee from merchants which lead to the reduction in sales, due to anti-steering provisions of Am-Ex, so it had to again reduce the transaction fee and thereby in this manner these anti-steering provisions hamper the competition from both the sides.

• THE RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET HERE IS A TWO–SIDED MARKET: It is critical to understand the difference between a one-sided market and a two-sided market in this scenario. The network of credit card companies provides for two separate but interrelated services to both merchants and cardholders. For cardholders, the credit card extends the credit facility which help them to spend more and to earn rewards like free movie tickets, discounts, free flight tickets, etc. While, for the merchants, the network allows them to avoid cost of processing the transactions and the risk of extending credits to customers, which indirectly would increase their sales.

By providing these services via their network, the credit card companies are bringing both merchants and customers on the same page, thus validating the economics of a two-sided market. Hence, here restricting/narrowing the Relevant Product Market only to the market of merchants is not a relevant consideration to prove the probable abuse of dominance by Rupay in future.

• MERCHANTS AND CARDHOLDERS ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO EACH OTHER, NOT THE SUBSTITUTES: Another crucial factor of consideration here is the nature of the product/services in this market to determine whether it is a two-sided or a one-sided market.

The cardholders and the merchants are not to be putted in the single product market while determining the relevant product market because they are not the substitutes; rather they are complimentary because of cross-elasticity of demand. For example- both gasoline and the tyres are essential for in making the car as a whole separate product, and no reasonable buyer would buy these essentials separately. Similarly, merchants and cardholders complement each other in constituting credit-card market. If anyone forbids the usage, the whole market structure will be hampered.

• HIGHER ROLE OF INDIRECT MARKET EFFECTS IN SUCH MARKETS WOULD ULTIMATELY DECREASE THE CONSUMER WELFARE: At this juncture it is also critical to look over the indirect market effect. Also, the relevance here is not to be looked from the perspective of Times-Picayune judgment,[10] as there indirect market effect is very low because as a reader people don’t give any heed to advertisements.

Here the situation is altogether different. Indirect market effect is actually high here. As whenever, the merchants are being charged more by the credit card network

providers, they will keep the MRP’s of their products high and burden of which will be shifted upon the ultimate consumers and considering price as a crucial factor of consumer welfare, consumer welfare will go down as they are being charged more. Further, the same would violate the underlying principle of consumer welfare (which is measured through one of the factors i.e., reduced prices) of both Harward and Chicago school of thought.

• NEED TO GO FOR THE EFFECT BASED APPROACH: Sometimes departure is to be made from the basic mode of scrutiny to find the appreciable adverse effect on competition. Structure, Conduct and Performance are to be looked from top-to-bottom as per Harward school of thought, but it is also relevant to adopt the bottom-to-top approach which approves Chicago school of thought i.e., performance/effect needs to be seen. It is pertinent to note that, when prima facie effect is visible, then there is no need to prove the relevant product market, as Rupay is abusing its dominance by vertically integrating with banks and merchants to cause adverse effect on the competition in the credit card network market and for this we already have the established and most convincing precedent before us i.e., the dissenting opinion laid down in the case of Ohio v.  American Express.[11]

Arguments of Rupay in Counter

THE RELEVANT MARKET IS ONE-SIDED MARKET AND THUS NO ANTI- COMPETITIVENESS: As held by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in the precedent of Ohio v. American Express that these platforms enable a single, concurrent transaction between users. For credit cards, the platform can only charge for its services if a retailer and a consumer both opt to utilise it at the same time. As a result, if a credit card network provides a merchant the equivalent of one transaction’s worth of card accepting services, it also has to sell the cardholder the equivalent of one transaction’s value of payment card services. It is unable to offer transaction services to specific consumers or merchants. The consumption of payment card transactions by cardholders and merchants, who both jointly consume a single good (payment card transactions), must be directly proportionate. The network must determine the right mix

of pricing that promotes the most connections among cardholders and businesses in order to maximise sales. Therefore, due simultaneous transaction on both sides of the market here the relevant product market is singular market.

• RUPAY HAS A VERY LESS MARKET SHARE VIS-À-VIS VISA AND MASTERCARD THEREBY NO ABUSE OF DOMINANCE: It is factually asserted that in India and only in the market of debit-cards Rupay holds a major share i.e., 60%. Meanwhile it is crucial to note that Visa and Mastercard are global and Indian giants in the credit-card markets as they hold for approximately 45% and 24% of transaction volume in the market and in also in India, they hold for almost 4/5th (approximately 80%) credit card network market.[12] Moreover, the business structure of Visa and Mastercard is very differentiated as they are cooperative banks and they are operating into multiple business lines. So, factually it is proven that Rupay is no way in the competition with Visa and Mastercard and also Rupay didn’t acted in any sought of anti-competitive behaviour.
• RUPAY’S BUSINESS MODEL IS NOT ANTI-COMPETITIVE, OTHERWISE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FORECLOSED IN THE MARKET: We have already delved into the market share and market structure of Rupay vis-à-vis Visa and Mastercard. Therefore, at this juncture it is also pertinent to note that if at any point of time Rupay had acted in anti-competitive manner, then it would have been foreclosed from the market by these mammals. Rather, as per the government norms, Rupay cater to the diverse needs. At present, on one side where Visa and Mastercard charges multiple costs even for their debit cards, at the other side Rupay is serving to the people of lowest income groups. Also, Visa and Mastercard snatches a chunk of amount from banks too to provide services to them on the other hand Rupay as per its nationalized policies is catering to the indigenous needs, thus no anti-competitive approach.
• THE SELECTIVE APPROACH OF VISA/MASTERCARD IS NEITHER REASONABLE NOR ACCEPTABLE: Mastercard and Visa is adopting a selective approach while fearing from Rupay’s diverse acceptance and popularity. It is evident and already established in the case of Ohio v. American Express,[13] that Visa and Mastercard charged higher merchant fee and transaction fee at places and times, where Rupay doesn’t operate altogether. Thereby, if anti-competitive behaviour is to be analysed then it is to be done at both ends.

• ANTI-STEERING BUT PRO-COMPETITIVE EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATION: It is pertinent to note that these anti-steering provisions, if done, would prove to be pro-competitive and efficient justification because of the two reasons:

1. Anti-steering provisions would promote the inter brand competition: In a relevant product market, both brands have a reasonable fear of their competitor acquiring large customers and market shares. Therefore, both the brand will compete for giving the best services to their stakeholders, so that they can gain the huge share and customers in the market.
2. Anti-steering provisions are welcomed by both merchants and customers: Merchants would be benefited because they don’t have to enter in any exclusive agreements with other network providers as cardholders are only using services of one credit card Company. Similarly, consumers would be benefited by getting higher rewards and higher satisfaction.
3. Consumer welfare is increasing by anti-steering contracts: Economic efficiency is measured through consumer wealth maximization which in turn is measured through consumer welfare and “Reduced Prices” is a crucial factor for consumer welfare.

Critical Analysis

The credit card market is the main scope of area and the relevant product Market behind proving the dominance and anti-competitiveness. With the lens of economic growth, the jurisprudence of Chicago and the Harvard schools of thought are analysed so as to conclude the authors’ critical perspective behind whether the actions by Rupay is anticompetitive in accordance with Section 3(3) and abusing the dominant position in accordance with Section 3(4).

Analysis of the position of India with respect to schools of thought

• With respect to Section 3(3) of the Competition Act of 2002,¹⁴ it was noted in the TELCO case,¹⁵ that Indian Competition Jurisprudence follows mainly two specific types of Agreements firstly, horizontal agreements and secondly, Vertical Agreements. In India, Horizontal Agreement are treated as persistent appreciable adverse effect on competition under Section 3(3) of the Competition Act of 2002 where it is judged under Per se Criteria in and Vertical Agreements in accordance with Section 3(4) of the Competition Act of 2002 are judged under the Rule of Reason Criteria.
• The Chicago School of thought follows per se rule whereas the Harvard School of thought paves the way forward for Rule of Reason Criteria. In India, the notion of consumer welfare has encouraged the idea for an economic justification and as noted in the case of Neeraj Malhotra v. Deutsche Post Bank Home Fund Limited (Deutsche Bank),¹⁶ that irrespective of the fact that the rule of per se has been interpreted under Section 3(3) of the Competition Act, the same is deemed to be ineffective in accordance with Section 19(3) which could be deciphered as an unintentional exception to the traditional approach of interpreting per se or in jurisprudential terms, the same denoted a shift away from the Harvard School of thought in India.
• In the case of Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P,¹⁷ the Court further noted Section 3(3) is in the nature of a rebuttable provision and the wording “shall be presumed” is not in the nature of a concrete evidence but in the nature of mere assumption.

The above reasoning deduces the fact that Indian Jurisprudence has shifted towards the Chicago School of thought from the old accepted Harvard School.

Conclusive Analysis in accordance with the parties’ arguments

WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 3(3) AND 3(4)- ANTI COMPETITIVENESS

The arguments of the parties vis-à-vis VISA, Mastercard and Rupay have been taken into consideration and certain points have been highlighted to reach to the final conclusion:

The present case is a classic example of Vertical Integration of Rupay with the Indian Merchants that to by following the due procedure as prescribed by the Nationalised Policies. The Vertical Integration of Agreements is governed by Section 3(4) of the Acts, which states that any agreement between enterprises or person at different levels in the market of the nature of exclusive distribution agreement and refusal to deal which as per the wording of section 3(4) causes or likely to cause AAEC could be deemed as anti-competitive.

In the present case, Rupay vertically integrated with banks in the presence of hub like the national authorities being the regulators which facilitates such type of transactions of Rupay with the Banks.

The same arrangement was facilitated by market forces i.e., the nationalised policies of India specifically the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojna, as well as RBI, the main regulator which helped in facilitating the entire transaction, thus proving the point that the arrangement or agreement as provided under Section 3(4) has been made because of the nationalised policies and the same can never be held to deal in activities like exclusive distribution to sale, and the refusal to deal. Such kind of agreements are not in contravention to Section 3(1) of the Indian Competition Act of 2002 since by 0following the rule of reason criteria, there are justifiable economic efficiency reasons behind the preference and the monopoly power given to Rupay in comparison to Mastercard and VISA. Thus, following the accepted Chicago School of thought principles, Rule of Reason is preferred which justifies the economic sufficient behaviour of Rupay in the Indian, which in no case can be held to be anti-competitive.

Rupay has been given the liberty by the Nationalised Policies and RBI to enter the market, and provide services in a much cheaper way than the US counterparts. The

policies supported Rupay’s Initial offering in the Market. This has motivated the US counterparts to raise the issue of Predatory Pricing and threats of activities like Foreclosure by Rupay. The companies fail to analyse the arrangements which are facilitated with the help of RBI as the Regulator, the same is keeping a strict check on Rupay’s market policies to ensure that no deviation in the behaviour of Rupay could happen in the future.

Subsequently, as noted above, the above behaviour is giving the opportunities to the US Counterparts to compete on the basis of providing better services to the customers, the same could very well encourage Competition in the Market and would ensure consumer welfare by increasing the choices amongst them.

Rupay was made to enter the markets to protect the Customers from the High merchant and Transaction fees on the side of Mastercard and VISA. This intention behind the Indian regulatory forces to support Rupay behaviour could be very established within the same criteria of Status-Quo Bias-effect as was noted in the case of Google v. LLC,[14] where the power of Default was incentivised and was used as to refrain the customers to shift to other applications. In India, Rupay has been incentivised as a default in the Market, and this practice does not hamper the competition in a sense, the same is encouraging the other companies to compete on the basis of Services, which indirectly is increasing the Consumer’s welfare in the market.

With Respect to Section 4: Abuse of Dominance

The provision for the Abuse of dominance has been provided under the Competition Act of 2002.[15]It has been clearly provided that an enterprise

• It is important to note that in the absence of a prima facie abuse of dominant powers, the existence of a position which is merely dominant shall not be considered as anti- competitive for the purposes of the act. Therefore, any possibility on the basis of the potential of the Company can never be the criteria to prove abuse of dominance in the Market.
• The case law of Satyen Narendra Bajaj vs Payu Payments Private Limited,[16] put forward a clear picture behind the inception of dominance under the Competition Law Jurisprudence where the Commission states that the Act has made a transition from illegalising mere monopolising by the words “monopoly per se bad”,²¹ to the abuse of dominant position which is conserved as bad omen in law.
• The Commission further pointed that to prove the abuse of dominance under Section 4(2) of the Act,[17] the presence of Prima facie fact of evidence of abusive conduct is necessary. In India, the position of Rupay in accordance with the Chicago School of Thought governed under the Rule of Reason could not be held as prima facie abusing its dominant power since the instance of exclusive determination, and predatory pricing and other important credentials on the part of Rupay are completely absent.
• THE PROBLEM OF BUNDLING: It is pertinent to note that in accordance with Section 4 of the Indian Competition Act, the exercise of bundling is deemed to be the abuse of dominant position. The mechanism of Bundling is making the customers available of products or services, in a single unit.[18] In India, IRCTC has integrated with UBI (Union Bank of India) and has launched IRCTC Ru-Pay Prepaid Card, where the Company of IRCTC Payment card has bundled with the Ru-Pay Payment Card, to launch a wholly new product. However, for the process of Bundling to satisfy the abuse of dominance criteria, two points needs to be ensured firstly, instigating the customers to purchase the products and secondly, implements an adverse effect on competition.[19]
• ARTICLE 82 OF THE EC TREATY: Article 82 of the EC Treaty,[20] holds the abuse of dominance as illegal prima facie. The European Commission has noted an important exception under the same wherein it necessitates that dominant position is not abused when a fruitful competition still exists on the services the other competitors provide. Notwithstanding the fact, any undertaking which do not face any developed- competitive constraints can be regarded as dominant. However, in the present case, the competitive constraints were evaded by the market policies of the country which, thus exempts the abuse of dominant position of Rupay in the credit market. Further, under Section 4(2) Explanation a defines the dominant position of a company only when it acts independently. of the forces being competitive in nature and existing in the Relevant Product or the Geographic Market

In this context, for the  above reasons stated, it is pertinent to note that the unfair and discriminatory practices have not been imposed by Rupay and circumstance of predatory pricing are not forseeable in the present case. Conclusively, the same cannot be held to abuse its dominant position in the relevant product market of Credit Cards.

Conclusion

Rupay’s business model is altogether a different model from that of Visa and Mastercard, wherein they don’t charge any annual sum or transaction fee form the merchants as per the norms of the NPCI (National Payments Corporation of India) and RBI (Reserve Bank of India), making it feasible and more economical even for the small merchants, keeping aside the value of transactions. Given the circumstances the possibility of anti-competitive in the present case shall be viewed from the lens of Rule of Reason and as such the competitive characteristics outweigh the anti-competitive ones in all aspects. Hence the case of Rupay though may seem prima facie anti-competitive but after thorough research it could be concluded that it’s not.

With the Indian position following the rule of reason under the Chicago School of thought and economic efficiency argument, the activities of Rupay cannot be deemed as anticompetitive and not be held as abuse of dominance.

---

This article is authored by Mr. Akshat Mehta and Ms. Shivani, final year students at Institute of Law Nirma University

---

[1] Re Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd, Case No. 03/201.

[2] M/s Excel Crop Care Limited v. Competition Commission of India, 2017.

[3] The Competition Act, 2002, Acts of Parliament, No. 13 of 2003, § 3(1).

[4] The Competition Act, 2002, Acts of Parliament, No. 13 of 2003, § 3(1).

[5] Harshita Chawla v. WhatsApp Inc.& Anr., CCI Case No. 15 of 2020 (18 August 2020).

[6] Automobile Dealers association v. Global Automobile Ltd. And Anr., CCI, Case No. 33 of 2011.

[7] Priyanka Iyer, Why has Ru-Pay rattled Visa and MasterCard? MONEY CONTROL accessible at: https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/why-has-rupay-rattled-visa-and-mastercard-7777841.html.

[8] Ohio v. American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179.

[9] Ibib.

[10] Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 610 (1953).

[11] Supra Note 2.

[12] Supra Note 2.

[13] Supra Note 1.

[14] Google v. LLC, Case AT 40099 – Google Android (European Council Android Decision).

[15] The Competition Act, 2002, Acts of Parliament, No. 13 of 2003, § 4.

[16] Satyen Narendra Bajaj vs Payu Payments Private Limited, Case No. 23 of 2019.

[17] The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (repealed w.e.f. 01.09.2009)

[18] Shri Sonam Sharma v Apple Inc USA.

[19] European            Commission         Opionion               accessible              at:           https://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF.

[20] The EC Treaty, Art. 82.